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Ab s t r A c t
How can we, as individuals and as members of religious, educational, and/
or social institutions, more adequately respond to the crises of sexual 
abuse that have come to light in recent years? This paper will address this 
question through the philosophical lens of Paul Ricoeur. The argument 
proposed here is that through Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of testimony, re-
sponsibility, and recognition, we can begin to approach, address, and eval-
uate the crises of sexual abuse we face by grounding our ethical reflections, 
and actions, within a more robust philosophical framework. Therefore, 
this paper will proceed as follows. The first three sections will investigate 
Ricoeur’s writings in order to glean from them three distinct hermeneu-
tical approaches to three different sets of criteria at play in contempo-
rary crises of sexual abuse: first, a hermeneutics of testimony, related to 
memory and history; second, a hermeneutics of responsibility, related to 
authority and justice; and, finally, a hermeneutics of recognition, related 
to forgiveness and forgetting. Insofar as each of these hermeneutical ap-
proaches offers us some insight into the problematics underlying crises 
of sexual abuse, the fourth section will offer an evaluation of these ap-
proaches by focusing on the specific case of the sexual abuse crisis in the 
Catholic Church. The final section will consider possible avenues for res-
olution of these crises through Ricoeur’s notion of exceptional “states of 
peace,” at the heart of which lies mutual recognition. My hope is that this 
contribution provides new avenues for conversation and deliberation, as 
well as new resources and frameworks for articulating and implementing 
responsible action in the face of sexual abuse.
 
Ab s t r A c t




IIntroductIon and thesIsIn 2002, the Boston Globe broke a story about allegations of sexual abuse in the Roman Catholic archdiocese of Boston (“Spotlight Investigation: Abuse in the Catholic Church”).1 Not only did these allegations prove true, but the sexual abuse scandal in Boston turned out to be a watershed 
moment for victims of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church worldwide. 
Not only have individual cases of sexual abuse come to light in diocese 
around the world, but compounding this scandal is the fact that, since 
2002, it has come to light that for decades before, and since, the public 
exposure of this abuse, the Church—at the local and international levels—
actively pursued a strategy of “cover-up” and sought to keep this informa-
tion from being publically revealed (see Hamilton 67–96). Since 2002, the 
Church has remained ineffective in addressing its sexual abuse crisis, and 
unable to provide an adequate explanation for its secrecy.
In 2010, the Boy Scouts of America were ordered to pay over $18.5 
million to a Scout who had been sexually abused in the 1980s by a Scout 
leader (Associated Press). Once again, what made this case problematic—
beyond the sexual abuse—was the evidence presented in court that indi-
cated the organization’s knowledge of the problem, and, consequently, the 
actions they took, not to protect the scout in question, but to protect the 
reputation of the organization (McGreal). Secrecy and cover-up prevailed, 
where responsibility and justice should have been the order of the day.
In 2011, a  former assistant football coach at Penn State, Jerry San-
dusky, was indicted by a grand jury for sexually abusing a number of young 
men while employed at the university (“Times Topics”). Once again, the 
scandal of Sandusky’s sexual abuse took on new life when it came to light 
that when brought to the attention of Sandusky’s superiors in the football 
program, as well as to a number of administrators at the university, the 
decision was made to cover up the situation, and keep it out of the public 
eye, rather than report it to the proper authorities. These individuals chose 
to protect their own interests and their own personnel, at the expense of 
the young men who continued to be abused.
The aforementioned examples of sexual abuse point to two things: 
first, the phenomenon of the sexual abuse of minors—a phenomenon that 
1 The source is the Boston Globe archive page dedicated to the unfolding of the 
sexual abuse crisis in the Archdiocese of Boston. It begins with the original two-part story 
from 6 January 2002 on Fr. John J. Geoghan and documents the unfolding of the crisis 
in the years after 2002. See also Betrayal by the Investigative Staff of the Boston Globe 
(Boston: Back Bay, 2003).
83
John Crowley-Buck
is both shocking and frightening; second, each of these institutions, when 
faced with the reality of sexual abuse within their ranks, chose to actively 
conceal this information from the public eye, and cover up the transgres-
sions of their respective communities. The sexual abuse of minors is a trag-
edy in and of itself, but the compounding of this tragedy through decisions 
and actions taken to cover up, rather than address and end, the problem of 
sexual abuse calls for pause—at the very least—from all those involved in 
these, and similar, communities.
The question must be asked: how can we respond to crises of sexual 
abuse more adequately? What are the resources we can enact to achieve 
this end? This, therefore, is the question I would like to address in this 
article, and I will do so from within the philosophical hermeneutics of Paul 
Ricoeur. Ricoeur, however, is not just an accidental conversation partner in 
these deliberations. The philosophical resources Ricoeur provides—specif-
ically through the concepts of testimony, responsibility, and recognition—
shed light, not only on the challenging phenomenon of sexual abuse itself, 
but on the potential avenues for attending to these crises latent within the 
dialectical tensions grounding these hermeneutical possibilities. Thus, the 
question from this point of view becomes: what resources does Ricoeur 
provide to help us approach crises of sexual abuse, understand—as much 
as possible—what happened, and evaluate potential avenues for us to move 
forward in the shadow of these crises?
In order to address this question, this article will proceed along the fol-
lowing lines. The first three sections will investigate Ricoeur’s writings in 
order to glean from them three distinct hermeneutical approaches to three 
different sets of criteria at play in contemporary crises of sexual abuse: 
first, a  hermeneutics of testimony, as it relates to memory and history; 
second, a hermeneutics of responsibility, as it relates to authority and jus-
tice; and, finally, a hermeneutics of recognition, as it relates to forgiveness 
and forgetting. Insofar as each of these hermeneutical approaches offers us 
some insight into the problematics underlying crises of sexual abuse, I will, 
in the fourth section, offer an evaluation of how the sexual abuse crisis in 
the Catholic Church, for example, can be viewed in light of a Ricoeurian 
understanding of testimony, responsibility and recognition. My hope is 
that this contribution can serve to open new avenues for conversation and 
deliberation, as well as new resources and frameworks for articulating and 
implementing responsible action in the face of sexual abuse.
Part I: MeMory, hIstory, and testIMony
When we begin to think about the phenomenon of sexual abuse, we 
must first ask a pair of interrelated questions: “What happened?” and “To 
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whom?” Without addressing these two questions, any attempts to address 
crises of sexual abuse would be misguided. This pair of interrelated ques-
tions finds a parallel in Ricoeur, who structures his discussion of memory 
between a similar set of questions: “Of what are there memories? Whose 
memory is it?” (Ricoeur, Memory 3). The impetus behind these questions 
becomes important insofar as Ricoeur wants to draw an important distinc-
tion—though, admittedly, a  fragile one—between memory and imagina-
tion. What is the content of this distinction? Pellauer suggests that “it is 
easy to confound [memory and imagination] in that they both appeal to 
the idea of an image . . . but in the case of memory [the image] is not absent 
in the sense of being unreal or feigned [as it might be in imagination], but 
rather as ‘having been’” (Pellauer 110). Ricoeur himself, in an interview 
with Richard Kearney, makes the same point: 
there is a positing act in memory whereas there is an unrealizing of his-
tory in imagination. It is very difficult to maintain the distinction; but it 
must be kept at least as a basic recognition of two opposite claims of the 
past, as unreal and real. (Kearney, Owl of Minerva 154)
Memories are therefore related to images and events that “have been”—
that were, at one point, “real.” This brings to the foreground the impor-
tant category of history, without which we would be unable to distinguish 
between memory and imagination—between the “having been real” and 
the “unreal.”
This is not to suggest, however, that history is the precursor of mem-
ory in a linear sense. The relationship between memory and history is one 
of dynamic interaction and mutual dependence. Memory can only be dis-
tinguished from imagination because of history, yet history can only be 
understood as a collection of memories. Borrowing from Michel de Cer-
teau, Ricoeur’s epistemological approach to history is that of the “histo-
riographical operation.” Within this operation, Ricoeur distinguishes three 
distinct, yet interconnected methodological movements or phases. The 
first phase, the “documentary phase,” is the one that spans the time from 
“the declarations of eyewitnesses to the constitution of archives” (Memory 
136). It is in this phase that the historiographical operation concerns it-
self with the establishment of “documentary proof.” The second phase is 
the “explanation/understanding” phase, which concerns itself with “the 
connective ‘because’ responding to the question ‘Why?’: why did things 
happen like that and not otherwise?” (Memory 136). The third phase of 
the historiographical operation, according to Ricoeur, is the representative 
phase, in which we encounter “writing that plainly states the historian’s 
intentions, which is to represent the past just as it happened—whatever 
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meaning may be assigned to this ‘just as’” (Memory 136). This final phase 
is, very basically, the writing of history. As the historiographical opera-
tion moves through each of these phases, we are once again confronted 
with the question of memory and how we come to know and believe some 
memories over and against others. How does the historian know what 
memories are “real,” and thus memory, or “unreal,” and thus imagination? 
Ricoeur’s response to these inquiries—his articulation of the place where 
the dynamic relationship between memory and history is located—is in 
a hermeneutics of testimony.
Testimony takes us with one bound to the formal conditions of the 
“things of the past,” the conditions of possibility of the actual process 
of the historiographical operation. With testimony opens an epistemo-
logical process that departs from declared memory, passes through the 
archive and documents, and finds its fulfillment in documentary proof. 
(Memory 161)
Testimony makes a bold claim to credibility: “I was there! Believe me!” 
Nevertheless, testimony is not free from suspicion. While testimony de-
clares “I was there! Believe me!”, it cannot escape a  nagging question: 
“Why should I?” For Ricoeur, the criteria for this suspicion are always 
already inherent in testimony. While testimony is always open, as Pellauer 
notes, to the retort “‘I don’t believe you’ . . . this does not disprove it, and 
. . . Ricoeur thinks in the end we must appeal to the conviction expressed 
by some testimony . . . if we are to say anything at all” (Pellauer 119). 
Greisch agrees with Pellauer when he suggests that “the credence which 
characterizes attestation is also the ‘trust’ which copes with suspicion” 
(Greisch 86). As for Ricoeur, while he does acknowledge the centrality 
and importance of an element of suspicion in the act of testimony, he ulti-
mately comes down on the side of credibility, rather than suspicion, when 
approaching testimony, and for the following reason: 
We must not forget that everything starts, not from the archives, but 
from testimony . . . whatever may be our lack of confidence in prin-
ciple in such testimony, we have nothing better than testimony, in the 
final analysis, to assure ourselves that something did happen in the past, 
which someone attests having witnessed in person. (Memory 147)
Testimony, memory and history are crucial for initiating an investigation 
into crises of sexual abuse, and these themes will follow us throughout 
this analysis. Before applying these concepts to a  concrete example of 
a crisis of sexual abuse, e.g. in the Roman Catholic Church, we must first 
develop two additional lines of thinking pertinent to this analysis: first, 
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a  hermeneutics of responsibility, as it relates to the tensions between au-
thority and justice, and, second, a hermeneutics of recognition, as it relates 
to the tensions between forgiveness and forgetting.
Part II: authorIty, JustIce, and resPonsIbIlIty
Ricoeur understands authority to be “the right to command, the power 
(recognized or not) to impose obedience” (Ricoeur, Reflections 91). This 
definition, he argues, “immediately underscores the dissymmetrical, hier-
archical aspect of a notion that brings face-to-face those who command 
and those who obey. But what a strange power that rests on a right, the 
right to command, which implies a  claim to legitimacy” (91). Through 
a simple definition of the term authority, Ricoeur is able to articulate the 
complexity of the issue at hand: authority claims a right to power, but what 
is this “right” and how is it legitimized? If the power is not legitimized—
i.e. the power to command is not the right of the authority—then such 
power borders on, and in most cases spills over into, violence. In such 
a case, an authority no longer commands because it has the “right” to do so, 
but rather it commands through domination. The key distinction Ricoeur 
makes between, on the one hand, an authority that has a legitimate right to 
command obedience and, on the other hand, an authority that commands 
through domination, is the question of credibility. “Authority does border 
on violence as the power to impose obedience as domination. But what 
distinguishes it from violence is precisely the credibility attached to its 
character of legitimacy” (Reflections 93). The question of credibility, then, 
becomes central to any discussion of authority in our contemporary situ-
ation. How does an authority earn and maintain such a level of credibility 
that it can hold the legitimate “right to command” and “power to impose 
obedience”? One possible articulation of the credibility criteria most per-
tinent to our contemporary situation would be the criteria of justice. An 
authority can claim a legitimate “right to command” and “power to impose 
obedience” if that authority can be seen and understood to be a just au-
thority.
In turning to the question of justice and the just, I want to focus on 
three pieces by Ricoeur: “Justice and Love,” “Justice and Truth,” and “Jus-
tice and Vengeance.” In “Justice and Love,” Ricoeur addresses an age-old 
question in religious, and specifically Christian, discourse: what is the re-
lationship between justice and love? For Ricoeur, there is an inherent and 
inevitable disproportion between justice and love because “love [speaks] 
. . . in a kind of language other than that of justice” (Figuring 317). Ricoeur 
notes that love speaks the language of praise, the complicated language of 
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command, and the language of feelings, but none of these are the language 
of justice: “neither the circumstances nor the means of justice are those of 
love . . . love does not argue . . . justice does argue” (Figuring 321). What is 
more, justice must come to a decision. Both justice and love are directed 
toward action: justice is directed toward the action of fairness and equality, 
articulated in the golden rule; love, on the other hand, requires one to go 
beyond the golden rule to the hyperethical and hypermoral commitment 
to the love of neighbor manifested in the love of one’s enemy. Ricoeur, 
nevertheless, offers the following caveat to this articulation of love: “If the 
hypermoral is not to turn into the nonmoral . . . it has to pass through the 
principle of morality, summed up in the golden rule and formalized by the 
rule of justice” (Figuring 328). Thus, in the justice/love dialectic, love is 
greater than justice, but irresponsible without it. Justice, in requiring the 
argumentation, deliberation and decision making love does not, grounds 
love in the moral realm. The relationship between justice and love, then, is 
an intimate dialectic, with each term requiring the other.
Next, in “Justice and Truth,” Ricoeur argues that the quest for jus-
tice—particularly as we find it in his practical ethical formulation: “aiming 
at the good life with, and for, others in just institutions”2—is the quest for 
“a just distance among all human beings” (Ricoeur, Reflections 61). Under-
stood in a framework of “just distance,” the question of truth takes on the 
force of an injunction for the acting agent, insofar as truth becomes the 
sieve—or the norm—through which justice must pass. Is Ricoeur speak-
ing of “objective truth” in these cases? No. Rather than “objective truth,” 
Ricoeur is speaking about “the certitude that in this situation this is the best 
decision, what has to be done” (Reflections 70). Passing through the sieve 
of truth, justice—and the agent behind the “just” action—becomes, in lan-
guage Ricoeur adopts from Kant, imputable. That is to say, having passed 
through sieve of truth, justice—as “just distance”—becomes imputable to 
the agent acting “justly”: the agent becomes responsible for their actions.
Finally, in “Justice and Vengeance,” Ricoeur analyzes the challenging re-
lationship between these two concepts. The primary aim of justice, Ricoeur 
suggests, is to move beyond vengeance, yet “the first stage of this emer-
gence of justice beyond vengeance coincides with the feeling of indignation, 
which finds its least sophisticated expression in the simple cry: ‘It’s not 
fair!’” (Reflections 223) This indignant cry, we can see from the discussion in 
the previous section, lacks “just distance”—a clear break—“between the ini-
tial tie between vengeance and justice” (Reflections 223). What Ricoeur sug-
gests, in order to overcome this lack of “just distance,” is the  involvement 
2 This ethical formulation is both articulated and addressed in the seventh and 
eighth studies of Ricoeur’s “little ethics,” Oneself as Another.
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of a third party to arbitrate between an offender and their victim (Reflec-
tions 224). Insofar as both justice and vengeance are action oriented—i.e. 
directed toward others—a third party is required to ensure that the “rule 
of justice” is observed. Ricoeur offers a number of “third party” alterna-
tives for maintaining the “rule of law” as the “just distance” between parties: 
written laws, courts, judges, the trial process, etc. Here again, however, the 
questions of authority, legitimacy, and credibility come to the fore. Any de-
cision rendered by a third party will be received as violent by the punished, 
even if the punishment is fair and just. Thus, the third party—as a source 
of authority—must be legitimate and credible; otherwise the decision ren-
dered will be perceived as violent domination rather than just punishment. 
Regardless of its justification or objective, however, Ricoeur reminds us that 
“punishment remains in the grip of the spirit of vengeance, which the spirit 
of justice has the project of overcoming” (Reflections 230). 
As previously argued, authority maintains its credibility and legitima-
cy through a commitment to the just. Thus, it is the concept of responsi-
bility that presents itself as the most reasonable hermeneutical framework 
for understanding the relationship between authority and justice. Ricoeur 
admits that the term “responsibility” is relatively new in philosophical dis-
course, and, as such, is not used with the precision that such a term re-
quires. For example, the term responsibility can be understood within the 
framework of civil law, where “responsibility is defined by the obligation to 
make up or to compensate for the tort one has caused through one’s own 
fault” (The Just 11). Additionally, it can be understood in the framework 
of penal law, where responsibility is “the obligation to accept punishment” 
(The Just 11). Responsibility extends beyond the legal sphere, as well, in 
a vagueness that, at the limit, articulates a sense of responsibility in which 
“you are responsible for everything and everyone” (The Just 12). For the 
purposes of our present discussion, the hermeneutics of responsibility we 
want to develop comes out of the ancient concept of imputation, through 
Kant, and into the contemporary understanding of responsibility as ac-
countability for one’s words and actions. With such an understanding of 
responsibility, we begin to see more clearly why it may well be the most ap-
propriate hermeneutical lens for understanding the relationship between 
authority and justice, and for addressing contemporary crises of sexual 
abuse, where questions regarding authority and justice are paramount.
Part III: ForgettIng, ForgIveness, and recognItIon
In what is probably the most challenging matrix discussed in this paper—
particularly when we integrate it into our conversation on crises of sexual 
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abuse—we turn now to the relationship between forgetting and forgive-
ness, through a hermeneutics of recognition.
For Ricoeur, forgetting—like forgiveness—designates the horizon of 
the entire investigation in Memory, History, Forgetting, insofar as forget-
ting exists within a “problematic of memory and faithfulness to the past” 
(Memory 412). Forgetting stands as the challenge par excellence to memory 
insofar as forgetting puts into question the very claim memory makes to 
reliability (Memory 414). This is not to say that forgetting is a category 
that we must overcome, but rather it is “the enigma constitutive of the 
entire problematic of memory” (Memory 414) that we must understand 
differently. Ricoeur acknowledges that we cannot remember everything at 
each given moment in our lives, but notes that this form of forgetting—
where something is not lost to memory, but is rather reserved in the mind 
to be recalled later—can, in fact, be foundational to the phenomenon of 
memory. As Pellauer notes, this type of forgetting—i.e. memory held in 
reserve—allows us to “speak of this kind of forgetting as forgetting that 
founds memory” (Pellauer 124). Thus, according to Ricoeur, we “abso-
lutely cannot speak of a duty of forgetting” (Memory 418) because to do 
so would undercut the entire foundation for memory. Ricoeur suggests, 
then, that “forgetting has a positive meaning insofar as having-been pre-
vails over being-no-longer in the meaning attached to the idea of the past. 
Having-been makes forgetting the immemorial resource offered to the 
work of remembering” (Memory 443). What remains to be discussed is the 
relationship between forgetting and Ricoeur’s three “abuses of memory”: 
blocked memory, manipulated memory, and obligated memory.
In discussing the relationship between forgetting and blocked mem-
ory, Ricoeur turns his attention to Freud, psychoanalytic theory, and the 
reality that “many instances of forgetting are due to impediments blocking 
access to the treasures buried in memory” (Memory 444). In the Freudian 
analysis, blocked memory is the result of the mind’s repression of traumat-
ic experiences. While the traumatic experience appears to be “forgotten,” 
psychoanalysis shows that, despite this “forgetting,” “the trauma remains 
. . . entire sections of the reputedly forgotten past can return” (Memory 
445). This is what makes blocked memory, paradoxically, unforgettable. 
Manipulated memory, on the other hand, does not deal with repressed 
memories, but rather with memories that have been subject to, and influ-
enced by, ideology. Ricoeur notes that “everything that compounds the 
fragility of identity also proves to be an opportunity for the manipula-
tion of memory, mainly through ideology” (Memory 448). As noted ear-
lier, Ricoeur acknowledges that we cannot remember everything at once. 
The danger of manipulated memory comes to the fore when higher—i.e. 
authoritative—powers play on the “blank spaces” of memory and “impose 
90
John Crowley-Buck
a canonical narrative [on social actors] by means of intimidation or seduc-
tion, fear or flattery. A devious form of forgetting is at work here, resulting 
from stripping the social actors of their original power to recount their ac-
tions themselves” (Memory 448). Forgetting becomes, in such cases, both 
semi-passive and semi-active. The social agents, while manipulated to a cer-
tain degree, still bear certain responsibilities for their situation, especially 
when forgetting becomes avoidance, or a wanting-not-to-know. Ricoeur, 
in response to this willingness to allow ourselves to be manipulated by 
authoritative powers, reformulates the Enlightenment’s Sapere aude! into 
the exclamation, Dare to give an account of yourself! (Memory 449). Finally, 
in addressing the relationship of forgetting and obligated memory, Ricoeur 
turns to the phenomenon of amnesty. As the commanded forgetting of 
the socio-political authority, amnesty’s aim is “the reconciliation of enemy 
citizens, civil peace” (Memory 453). Expanding on Ricoeur’s definition, 
Kearney reminds us that, for Ricoeur, “amnesty is never amnesia. The past 
must be recollected, re-imagined, rethought and worked through” (Owl 
of Minerva 97). This is distinct from, say, pardon, where amnesia is the 
goal—a forgetting of the past, particularly when that past is problematic 
for the authority authorizing the pardon. Latent within this conversation 
on forgetting, and the next topic for discussion, is the challenging question 
of forgiving:
Against the “never” of evil, which makes pardon impossible, we are 
asked to think the “marvel of a once again,” which makes it possible. 
But the possibility of forgiveness is a “marvel” precisely because it sur-
passes the limits of rational calculation and explanation. (Kearney, Owl 
of Minerva 96)
As Kearney quite eloquently demonstrates, forgiveness is rather distinct 
from the principle trajectory of Ricoeur’s work in Memory, History, Forget-
ting. Nevertheless, it is with a discussion of forgiveness that Ricoeur ends 
this work. If, Ricoeur suggests, the concept of forgiveness exists at all, then 
it must exist along the same continuum as memory, history, and forget-
ting, but as an extension beyond them. The concept of forgiveness pre-
sumes that there are, in fact, situations in which “we can accuse someone of 
something [and] presume him to be or declare him guilty” (Memory 460). 
Thus, the notion of imputability is essential to a Ricoeurian understanding 
of forgiveness. Imputability allows us to bind an agent to his or her actions 
and to find fault with particular agents and/or actions. Fault, for Ricoeur, 
“consists in transgressing a rule . . . [or more] fundamentally, a harm done 
to others” (Memory 461). Thus, suggests Ricoeur, “fault in its essence is 
unforgivable not only in fact but by right” (Memory 466). Yet, in the end, 
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“there is forgiveness” (Memory 466). For this reason, Ricoeur understands 
forgiveness to be beyond the traditional systems of ethics and morality. For-
giveness goes above and beyond what analytical philosophy can argue for 
or understand. Quoting Derrida, Ricoeur notes that “forgiveness is not, 
and it should not be, either normal, or normative, or normalizing. It should 
remain exceptional and extraordinary” (Memory 469). Otherwise, were for-
giveness understood as normative or normalizing, “it would consist in lift-
ing the punitive sanction, in not punishing when one can and should punish. 
. . . Forgiveness creating impunity is a great injustice” (Memory 470). Nev-
ertheless, insofar as imputability binds an agent to his or her action, forgive-
ness—without becoming a  substitute for impunity—“should release the 
agent from his act” (Memory 489). Thus, under the sign of forgiveness, says 
Ricoeur, “the guilty person is to be considered capable of something other 
than his offenses and his faults. He is held to be restored to his capacity for 
acting, and action restored to its capacity for continuing” (Memory 493).
The question, however, remains: how do we navigate the terrain 
between forgetting and forgiving? How do we know the role of forget-
ting, and when (if at all) are we to release an agent from his or her action 
through forgiveness? The most promising way, according to Ricoeur, is 
through a hermeneutics of recognition. When he speaks about recogni-
tion, Ricoeur refers to it “as a minor miracle” (Memory 416). Through this 
“minor miracle,” we “recognize as being the same the present memory 
and the first impression intended as other” (Memory 39). Recognition, 
however, is not simply limited to images and impressions. For Ricoeur, 
our understanding of recognition develops beyond this initial stage and, 
as Pellauer notes, moves “from recognizing a thing to recognizing oneself, 
to recognizing others, to, finally, being recognized as oneself by others” 
(127). The danger here, of course, is the threat of misrecognition—a phe-
nomenon which “runs the spectrum from disregard to disrespect, to con-
tempt and even denial of the other’s humanity . . . [this] is always possible 
because of the fundamental dissymmetry between oneself and others” 
(Pellauer 133). While we can appreciate the centrality of the concept of 
recognition in general, how, we might ask, does this understanding of rec-
ognition relate to forgetting and forgiveness? With regard to forgetting, 
recognition allows us to distinguish between the “having-been” and the 
“being-no-longer” of the past. Recognizing the “having-been,” over and 
against the “being-no-longer,” makes the space for forgetting to become 
a foundation for memory. It is in light of this that Ricoeur can make the 
claim that “every act of memory . . . is thus summed up in recognition” 
(Memory 495). As for forgiving, recognition plays a  central role in its 
procedural unfolding. Forgiveness requires an act of recognition  insofar 
as one must recognize the agent, the action, and the link between the 
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two in order to impute responsibility. This act of recognition is especially 
pertinent in the case of faulty actions. Without recognition, we are un-
able to impute responsibility to an agent and bind them to their action. 
Without this imputation of responsibility, we are unable to release the 
agent, through an act of forgiveness, from his or her action. Thus, a her-
meneutics of recognition must hold a central place in any discussions on 
forgetting and forgiving.
In the final section of this paper, I will turn to a specific example of 
a crisis of sexual abuse in order to try and concretize the more conceptual 
analysis provided up to this point. As such, I will turn to the sexual abuse 
crisis in the Catholic Church in order to evaluate the relevance and effec-
tiveness of the proposed Ricoeurian hermeneutics of testimony, responsi-
bility, and recognition, within the matrices of memory, history, authority, 
justice, forgetting, and forgiveness.
Part Iv: a rIcoeurIan resPonse to crIses oF sexual abuse: 
the roMan catholIc church
The first set of questions we must ask about any crisis of sexual abuse, and 
specifically the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church, deals with the 
category of memory: “What happened?” and “To whom?” In approaching 
the category of memory, the first step we must take is toward those persons 
whose experiences constitute the “what” of memory and who, as persons, 
constitute its “whom”: the victims. This move toward the victims themselves 
goes against the more “typical” move made in these cases toward the “re-
cord keepers” or the “institutional archives” that house the official accounts 
of “what happened” and “to whom.” In the case of the Catholic Church, 
the “record keepers” are the hierarchy of the Catholic Church themselves: 
priests, bishops, cardinals, and popes. I  would argue, however, that such 
movement is misdirected. The first step in any process of attending to sexual 
abuse ought to be a step toward the victims of sexual abuse themselves. In 
speaking to the victims—in listening to their stories—we are given access to 
their memories of what happened through their testimony, characterized in 
the Ricoeurian phrase, “I was there! Believe me!” Their testimony provides 
access to the embodied and embattled memories that are not stored in the 
“documentary proof” of the official institutional archives. This attention to 
the testimony of the victims also aids in addressing the testimonial injustice 
many victims have experienced, and continue to experience.3 
3 For an interesting reflection on, and analysis of, testimonial and epistemic 
injustice, see Fricker. 
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When we consider this category of testimony with regards to the sex-
ual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church, we are tragically faced with a phe-
nomenon that Ricoeur himself acknowledged as latent within the concept 
of testimony—namely, the “criteria of suspicion” that accompany all acts of 
testimony. The “criteria of suspicion” are that which responds to the claim 
“I was there! Believe me!” with the retort “Why should I?” This highlights 
the unavoidable ambiguity of testimony, and gestures toward one of the 
challenges facing the victims of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church. Vic-
tims must overcome this oft-heard retort to their claims for recognition 
and justice. The perpetrators of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church, and 
their protectors, have frequently and systematically incubated these seeds 
of doubt, inherent in testimony, in order to foster scenarios whereby sus-
picion, rather than trust, becomes the modus operandi for understanding 
testimony. What Ricoeur offers, in these cases, is the important response to 
the response (of suspicion) that while we must acknowledge the ambigui-
ties of history and memory that reveal themselves in testimony, if we are 
to say and/or do anything at all, we must have, on some level, trust in the 
validity of the testimony we receive. Ricoeur is not suggesting that we “turn 
off ” the voice of suspicion—this would be impossible—but, rather, that we 
must keep an ear out for those moments of truth in testimony if we are to 
say anything about anything at all. Not to orient ourselves towards others 
in this way, suggests Ricoeur, will give rise not only to suffering, but to the 
suffering other. For Ricoeur, suffering is defined “by the reduction, even 
the destruction, of the capacity for acting, of being-able-to-act” (Ricoeur, 
Oneself as Another 190), and this is precisely the suffering incurred by the 
victims of sexual abuse. When the seeds of doubt sown by suspicion are fa-
vored over the moments of truth in testimony, the testifying other is made 
to suffer: their self-integrity is violated and, as a result, their ability to act in 
a given situation is impaired, if not eliminated. As a remedy for this unequal 
form of relationality—as a response to the suffering other—Ricoeur offers 
friendship—that form of relationality constituted by equality:
While equality is presupposed in friendship . . . equality is reestablished 
only through the recognition by the self of the superiority of the other’s 
authority . . . equality is reestablished only through the shared admission 
of fragility and, finally, of mortality. (Oneself as Another 192)
This balancing act between attending to suspicion, while simultaneously 
recognizing the need for trust in, and friendship with, the suffering other, 
is one of the important contributions Ricoeur makes to the discourse on 
sexual abuse in the Catholic Church.
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Another prominent Ricoeurian theme that arises from this discussion 
on testimony, suspicion, and trust is the concept of authority, and within 
this concept, the concept of justice. Authority, for Ricoeur, consists in “the 
right to command” and “the power to impose obedience.” The right to 
command, of course, rests on a claim to legitimacy—a claim that the com-
manding authority deserves to be obeyed and respected. If this is the case, 
then any claimant of such a right must recognize that, if it is not seen as 
a legitimate wielder of the right to command obedience, then it cannot be 
seen as authoritative because it has no legitimate claim to credibility. In the 
example of the Catholic Church, if its authority and credibility were not 
lost over the decades of sexual abuse, then they were certainly lost when 
civil court documents revealed that the Church had, in fact, been aware of 
the crisis and chosen to cover up and conceal it. Without the criterion of 
credibility to legitimate its right to command obedience, any such exercise 
of authority—or, one might say in these cases, of domination—demands 
that the question of justice be more openly and directly addressed.
Ricoeur offered a number of insights into the question of justice, but 
what remains most important for the discussion at hand is that justice, in 
the Ricoeurian paradigm, rests on a foundation of fairness and equality. It 
is, of course, only with a foundation in justice that love even becomes pos-
sible for Ricoeur. Love—agape—is at the heart of the Catholic Church’s 
mission in the world, and this is precisely what becomes impossible for 
the Catholic Church to embody and endorse without justice. Recall that, 
for Ricoeur, “it is first in contrast to justice that agape presents its creden-
tials” (Ricoeur, Course of Recognition 220). Agape pertains to the realm of 
the hypermoral and the hyperethical, embodied in the Christian mandate 
to “love one’s enemies.” In order, however, for agape to avoid becoming 
the epitome of the non-moral, the epitome of the unjust, there must be 
an underlying conceptualization of justice through which, in addition to 
the Golden Rule, agape must pass. The apparent opposition between agape 
and justice is overcome through the recognition that the former, at least in 
practice, must be in some way dependent on the latter. While it is also true 
that agape, for Ricoeur, speaks a different language than justice, if we bring 
Ricoeur into conversation with the Catholic Church on agape, particularly 
in light of the Catholic Church’s crisis of sexual abuse, we see more clearly 
the need for articulating this relationship between agape and justice. While 
it is true that “agape declares itself, proclaims itself ” while “justice makes 
arguments” (Course of Recognition 223), we cannot avoid the fact, in prac-
tice at least, that “the test of credibility for any talk about agape lies within 
the dialectic of love and justice” (222). Ricoeur’s discourse on agape pro-
vides the Catholic Church, particularly in light of its crisis of sexual abuse, 
with the transformative possibility of a  renewed language of agape. The 
95
John Crowley-Buck
justice and authority claimed by the Catholic Church today must account 
for the dialectic of love and justice, and this through an acknowledgement 
and acceptance of responsibility for the injustice the Catholic Church has 
perpetrated against the victims of clerical sexual abuse. Avoidance of this 
responsibility fundamentally undermines the claim of the Catholic Church 
to being a credible, legitimate authority that embodies the hypermoral and 
hyperethical realm of agape. Only through the lens of responsibility can 
this rupture be addressed, and it is only through this same approach that 
we can begin down the pathway of forgetting, forgiving, and recognition.
Analyzing the concept of forgetting, and the possibility of forgive-
ness, is difficult in itself, but especially in light of crises of sexual abuse. 
Many of the memories of sexual abuse have been blocked by a victim’s own 
psyche; other memories have been manipulated by institutional authorities 
that have, over the years, been determined to keep these crises within their 
control; still other memories have been lost through commanded amne-
sia. The loss of these memories undercuts their reliability, yet returning 
to Freud, as Ricoeur does, can prove to be invaluable in these cases. While 
memories may be blocked, manipulated or commanded, they still remain 
in the psyche. In the case of sexual abuse victims, the trauma of what they 
suffered is not likely to be forgotten completely. Thus, the type of forget-
ting pertinent to these situations will not be the “being-no-longer,” but 
rather the “having-been” of memory—memory held in reserve. This is the 
form of forgetting that, as Pellauer notes, founds memory. It is precisely 
here that Ricoeur’s analysis of forgetting impacts the sexual abuse crisis in 
the Catholic Church. Insofar as it pertains to the “having-been” of memo-
ry—a designation that requires a fundamental trust in testimony—forget-
ting becomes the discursive space for recalling memories held in reserve in 
the hopes of retrieving those memories that have been blocked, reclaiming 
those memories that have been manipulated, and naming those memories 
that have been commanded. Challenging though it may be, analyzing the 
forms of forgetting is integral for understanding what we mean when we 
speak of recognition.
The possibility of forgiveness is even more difficult to address, but 
in a substantially different way than the question of forgetting. For both 
Ricoeur and Derrida, “each time that forgiveness is in the service of some 
finality . . . each time that it tends to reestablish a normalcy . . . then ‘for-
giveness’ is not pure—nor is its concept” (Ricoeur, Memory 469). For-
giveness, if it is to be understood as forgiveness, cannot be expected, it 
cannot be counted on, and it cannot be demanded. Forgiveness, like agape, 
is a gratuitous gift—one that goes beyond reason and calculation. Forgive-
ness could be understood as violent or unjust if it went down the road of 
pardon or amnesia, but in such cases it would, in fact, cease to be genuine 
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forgiveness. What forgiveness can, and often does, do is grant amnesty. It 
does not forget, or discard, the fault that led to the transgression of rights. 
What forgiveness does is acknowledge the wrong committed, then pro-
ceeds to release the agent from his or her guilty actions. As has been said, 
the act of forgiveness is beyond reason—it is supererogatory. This also 
goes to show that an act of forgiveness—a genuine act of forgiveness—is 
not something that we can “work towards” or “argue for.” It can only be 
something freely and gratuitously given by the victims themselves.
If this is the case, that forgetting—of all things—is that which grounds 
memory and, consequently, the possibility of forgiveness, which cannot be 
“worked towards” or “argued for,” then we appear to be left without a com-
prehensive, all-encompassing response to sexual abuse, particularly in the 
Catholic Church. Perhaps, however, this is Ricoeur’s point exactly. What 
Ricoeur offers us, against a one-size-fits-all response to crises of sexual abuse, 
are what he, and others, call “states of peace.” These are “peaceful  experiences 
of mutual recognition,” the exceptional character of which “underscores their 
importance, and precisely in this way ensures their power to reach and affect 
the very heart of transactions stamped with the seal of struggle” (Course of 
Recognition 219). Mutual recognition within states of peace—this is what 
Ricoeur offers the Catholic Church as it faces its sexual abuse crisis. The 
Catholic Church must attend to what it means to be recognized as oneself 
by others—especially by suffering others. Even—perhaps especially—in the 
brokenness of abused bodies and identities, the Catholic Church must expe-
rience the “other” who demands recognition, not only as a victim of sexual 
abuse, but as a person whose very self-identity has been fractured by the (in)
actions of the Catholic Church. It is only in this passive form of recogni-
tion—“where the subject places him—or herself under the tutelage of a re-
lationship of reciprocity” (Course of Recognition 248)—that the necessary 
mutuality, constitutive of Ricoeur’s states of peace, comes to fruition. It is 
only in true sympathy that the self, or in this case the Catholic Church
. . . whose power of acting is at the start greater than that of its other, 
finds itself affected by all that the suffering other offers to it in return. 
For from the suffering other there comes a giving that is no longer drawn 
from the power of acting and existing but precisely from weakness it-
self. This is perhaps the supreme test of solicitude, when unequal power 
finds compensation in an authentic reciprocity of exchange, which, in 
the hour of agony, finds refuge in the shared whisper of voices or the 
feeble embrace of clasped hands. (Oneself as Another 191)
While these moments of mutual recognition—these states of peace—are ex-
ceptional, we are, perhaps, not without examples of such moments in the 
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wake of the sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church. In February 2011, 
the Archdiocese of Dublin, led by Archbishop Diarmuid Martin and Cardi-
nal Sean O’Malley, held a Liturgy of Lament and Repentance at St. Mary’s 
Pro-Cathedral in Dublin, Ireland. This liturgy was offered as a  space for 
the victims of sexual abuse to join with the Catholic Church in a ceremony 
that was, at the same time, an act of repentance and an attempt at an act of 
mutual recognition. The Archdiocese of Dublin exposed itself to its victims, 
seeking forgiveness, while the victims of sexual abuse exposed themselves 
to the community that failed them, yet which they sought to recognize 
as something—in hope at least—that could be better than its past actions 
constrained it to being. Though almost unheard of—and unrepeated—else-
where, the Liturgy of Lament and Repentance embodies the possibility of 
a way forward for both the Catholic Church and the victims of its sexual 
abuse crisis—the possibility of mutual recognition. As Ricoeur notes, 
[the] struggle for recognition perhaps remains endless. At the very least, 
the experiences of actual recognition . . . confer on this struggle for rec-
ognition the assurance that the motivation which distinguishes it from 
the lust for power and shelters it from the fascination of violence is nei-
ther illusory nor vain. (Course of Recognition 246)
conclusIon
Throughout this investigation, we have attempted to address two sets of 
questions. First, how can we more adequately respond to crises of sexual 
abuse? Second, what resources do the writings of Paul Ricoeur provide to 
help approach these crises of sexual abuse, understand—as much as pos-
sible—what happened therein, and evaluate potential avenues for moving 
forward in the shadow of these crises? In the end, I hope to have shown 
that Paul Ricoeur offers us not only tools, but avenues, for doing precisely 
this. Ricoeur’s categories of testimony, responsibility, and recognition of-
fer us three distinct, yet interrelated, ways of approaching and attending to 
the dynamics of these crises, as well as offering an avenue for the articula-
tion of states in which forgiveness and reconciliation become possible. It is 
my hope that this article can serve to open such avenues for conversation 
and deliberation, as well as provide resources and frameworks for articu-
lating and implementing responsible recognition and action amidst, and 
within, circumstances that are grievously irresponsible and which can only 
be described as moments of mis- or non-recognition.
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